Search results for " subjectivism"
showing 3 items of 3 documents
SUBJETIVISMO ÉTICO Y OBJECIÓN DE CONCIENCIA
2018
In this paper, I will present the conceptual differences between civil disobedience and conscientious objection, which have been depicted by liberal authors such as J. Rawls, J. Raz and in Spain by M. Gascón Abellán. I will argue that conscientious objection, as a practice that is distinct from civil disobedience and rests on a right to “moral privacy”, finds his justification on a subjectivist ethics or on a voluntarist account of natural law. I will try to show that in both cases, it is not clear how a) to justify legal norms that tries to balance the objectors’ claims and the opposite claims of rights’ holders b) to determine the seriousness of the ethical commitment of conscientious obj…
Etica della popolazione. Sul ruolo delle intuizioni morali
2019
In questa tesi vengono analizzati i principali argomenti per risolvere i paradossi dell'etica della popolazione (dibattito di etica normativa). Gli argomenti vengono suddivisi in due stili rispondenti a regole diverse. Segue un'analisi sul piano metodologico dei due stili morali, presentati come due modi di intendere la ricerca rawlsiana di un equilibrio riflessivo. Dopo aver messo a fuoco le differenze principali tra questi due stili viene avanzata la tesi secondo la quale uno di essi sia il metodo di indagine normativa proprio del Soggettivismo (tesi per cui le ragioni che abbiamo per agire dipendono dalle nostre proattitudini teliche). In this work the main arguments that have been put f…
Normativity, moral realism, and unmasking explanations
2004
Moral Projectivism must be able to specify under what conditions a certain inner response counts as a moral response. I argue, however, that moral projectivists cannot coherently do so because they must assume that there are moral properties in the world in order to fix the content of our moral judgements. To show this, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism, which is, nowadays, the most prom- ising version of moral projectivism. In this context, I call into question both David Lewis' dispositionalist account of colour and Chistine Korsgaard's procedural realism.